Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2007 黄海波 中国对外援助机制的现状和趋势 - § 5 references coded [ 2.28% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

商务部国 际经济合作事务局以及中国进出 口银行就是两个重要的我国对外 援助的协作支持机构

Reference 2 - 1.02% Coverage

———商务部、外交部和财政   
部三部门援外工作联动机制; ———商务部、中国人民银行、   
财政部以及国家开发银行、进出 口银行等部门和机构的减免债务 工作机制; ———商务部、外交部、解放军 总参谋部等部门的紧急人道主义   
援助联动工作机制; ———23 部委援外合作机制; ———商务部与地方省区商务   
部门的工作联系机制; ———商务部部内 14 个司局   
援外工作联系机制; ———商务部、外交部、财政部   
及部内财务、人事、纪检和地区司 等单位和技术专家建立的援外项   
目巡检机制; ———与进出口银行优惠贷款   
联席会议工作机制等。

Reference 3 - 0.30% Coverage

作为我国对外援助 工作的辅助管理力量, 主要负责 我国对外援助业务的促进、服务 和保障工作, 并承担推动我国企 业“走出去”开展对外经济合作业 务的促进工作

Reference 4 - 0.49% Coverage

中国政府优惠贷款的政府归 口管理部门为商务部, 负责制订 政策和计划, 签署优惠贷款框架 协议, 中国进出口银行负责项目 评估审查、放款、贷款管理、本息 回收等。每年的贷款规模, 由中国 人民银行会同商务部、外交部、中 国进出口银行提出, 并报国务院 批准。

Reference 5 - 0.29% Coverage

中国对外援助的归口单位是   
商务部援外司, 主要负责拟定并 执行对外援助政策; 起草对外援 助法律、法规, 拟订部门规章; 研 究和推进对外援助方式改革;

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2010 杨鸿玺 中国对外援助\_成就\_教训和良性发展 - § 2 references coded [ 1.18% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.97% Coverage

整个 70 年代，中国在 46 个国家建成项目 560 个，援助范围从亚洲、 非洲扩大到拉美和南太地区。①   
这些建成项目中，包括一些规模大、投资多、   
技术复杂的大中型项目，对于受援国经济和社会发展具有重要作用。在非洲国 家中，最大的项目是坦赞铁路，该项目成为中国与坦赞两国和人民长期友好和 合作的友谊象征，产生了重要的国际影响。在中国的对外援助中，对越南的援 助时间最长，数量最大。截至 1978 年，中国援越的军事物资可以装备 200 万陆海空军队。这些援助不附带任何条件，绝大部分是无偿的。到 1978 年止， 按当时国际价格计算，中国援越总值达 200 亿美元。

Reference 2 - 0.21% Coverage

总体表现为物资援助和现汇援助减 少、成套项目援助比例上升、技术和智力援助取得较大发展。三是由双边援助 转为多边援助合作。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2013 朱丹丹 国际援助体系与中国对外援助 影响 挑战及应对 - § 1 reference coded [ 1.40% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.40% Coverage

对于经济较为贫困的国家来   
讲， 落后的经济基础设施已经成 为其减贫和发展的首要障碍，这 些国家实现千年发展目标的机会 在很大程度上取决于经济基础设 施薄弱问题的解决；而且，与发达 国家相比， 经济基础设施建设是 中国等新兴援助国的比较优势。 因此， 与传统援助国侧重于援助 社会基础设施和服务部门不同， 在提供对外援助时， 中国等新兴 援助国主要关注经济基础设施和 服务部门及生产部门， 以期为受 援国的经济增、 就业和减贫奠定 经济基础，这也是“发展有效性” 理念的充分体现。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017 刘晴 全球治理视角下中国对外援助的理念与策略演变 - § 2 references coded [ 1.80% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.85% Coverage

即国内的跨国合作。以湖南省承办的商务部援外培训工作 为例，“截至 2016 年年底，已成功举办了 380 多期培训班，其 中有 13 期部长级官员培训班，培训外国官员和技术人员共 1 万余人，培训内容涉及商贸管理、工程机械、农业技术、医 疗器械、清洁能源、汽车、有色金属等十几个领域，学员遍及 亚非拉等 120 多个国家和地区

Reference 2 - 0.95% Coverage

西方传统援助主体是美国和少数发达国家 的政府，而中国援助是“中国商务部、受援国相关政府部门 和中国国内公司三方主体共同介入的管理结构”。如中国 援助格鲁吉亚蔬菜大棚种植第一期技术合作项目，在中国格鲁吉亚两国政府经济技术合作框架下，由湖南省农业集团 有限公司承办。［15］   
市场经济的介入，使得中国的对外援助工   
作开辟了新的援外资金渠道和援助方式。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017 朱丹丹 中国的民生援助经验评价和改进建议 - § 4 references coded [ 2.33% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.53% Coverage

技术合作主要是为了向发展 中国家转移适用的民生技术，帮 助它们掌握某一领域或行业的规 划、研发以及专门技术等，以此增 强受援国的自主发展能力， 避免 援助项目在援助国撤离后被搁置 甚至瘫痪。可以说，技术合作方式 最充分地体现了中国“授人以渔” 的援助理念。

Reference 2 - 1.05% Coverage

人力资源开发合作是指中国 通过多双边渠道， 帮助受援国培 养民生领域的管理人员和专门的 技术人员， 具体方式包括官员研 修班、专业技术人员培训、留学生 交流项目等。其中，官员研修班主 要是由中国商务部开展， 而技术 人员培训更多由科技部进行，留 学生交流项目则多由教育部负 责。在开展人力资源开发合作时， 除了与受援国之间直接的双边合 作，中国还会与全球多边机构（如 世行、联合国系统）、区域多边机 构（如欧盟、亚投行）或者第三方 国家（如英国、德国等）通过三方 合作的方式帮助发展中国家培养 专业人才。

Reference 3 - 0.49% Coverage

派遣驻外人员主要是向受援 国当地派遣技术人员、 医疗队或 者志愿者等专家团队， 直接在当 地为受援国提供所需的帮助和指 导。 派遣技术人员实际上属于技 术合作的范畴， 只是未必依存于 具体项目， 帮助受援国解决技术 难题，并培养专业技术人员。

Reference 4 - 0.26% Coverage

中国民生援助最典型的特点 就是政府居于绝对主导地位。 政 府部门为民生援助项目提供资金 支持，并负责项目的规划、实施、 管理。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2018 哈巍 中国对非洲国家的教育援助是否具有能源导向 - § 2 references coded [ 0.62% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.43% Coverage

至于中国对非教育援助的主要构成情况，根据《中 ，中国的对外教育援助   
国的对外援助（2014）》白皮书[11]   
主要分为政府奖学金、短期培训、文化交流、孔子学院、 学校建设和捐赠、教师借调和高校合作，其中政府奖学 金是在官方文件中被提到最多的，也是最主要的中国 教育援助的方式

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

申请成功与否在很大程度上是由中国政府来决定的。 所以能否成功地申请到政府奖学金，更多的是一件外 交事务，其次才是教育事务

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2019 董桂才 医疗援助对中国双边贸易的影响研究 基于门槛效应的实证检验 - § 3 references coded [ 2.04% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.40% Coverage

医疗卫生一直是中 国对外援助的重点领域，而且是最具可持续性、效果最好的 国际援助项目。即使在1980 年代中国全面减少对外援助之 际，医疗援助仍然保持稳定增长，并因此而成为“持续时间最 长、涉及国家最多、成效最为显著”的国际援助项目

Reference 2 - 0.86% Coverage

援外医疗队不仅承担了所在医院的主要诊疗任务，还通   
过临床带教、共同手术、举办专题讲座和培训班等各种形式， 向当地医务人员传授医疗技术，内容涉及疟疾、艾滋病、血吸 虫病等传染病防治，病人护理以及糖尿病、风湿病治疗等领 域，针灸、推拿、保健、中医药等中国传统医学，为受援国培养 卫生人才，留下了一支“不走的医疗队”。由于习惯和熟悉 了中国医生的诊疗设备和处方，这支“不走的医疗队”带动 中国医疗设备、器械和药品的出口。中国著名的抗疟药品青 蒿素及其衍生药品每年超过 50%的份额出口到非洲国家或 地区。

Reference 3 - 0.78% Coverage

中国对外医疗援助是一个受援国驱动的机 制，派遣医疗队的需求是由受援国首先提出; ［18］   
2000 年中   
非合作论坛成立后，中国政府向非洲国家派遣医疗队成为中 非合作论坛框架下中国对非援助的重要举措之一，成为“南 南合作的典范”。而且中国政府历来强调，包括医疗援助在 内的所有对外援助，不附件任何政治条件，不干涉受援国内 政。因此，中国对外医疗援助对增强双边政治互信，具有重 要意义。而现有的文献已经证明，良好的国际政治关系对双 边贸易具有积极的促进作用

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2020 于浩淼 双轨制-中国农业多边对外援助治理结构探索 - § 4 references coded [ 1.83% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.42% Coverage

总体来看，在中国—FAO南南合作框 架下，并非每个国别项目都实现了预期的目标，这与受援国是否发挥了主观 能动性以及受援国参与的程度和质量有关。例如，在中国与 FAO 在乌干达 实施的南南合作项目中，乌干达积极发挥主观能动性，从上到下高度配合， 提供了配套的人、财、物支持，不仅建立了科研机构间的农业技术交流与合

Reference 2 - 0.59% Coverage

国从原来的南南合作参与者，即从仅派遣 技术专家或技术员的角色转变为捐赠者和技术提供者的双重角色，并由此专 门设置了管理部门、管理岗位和人员梯队，直接参与对外援助项目的磋商、 管理和协调等。中国农业农村部与 FAO 建立了完善的南南合作工作机制。 在项目的日常运行中，中国的援外项目管理团队与 FAO 总部、FAO 驻受援 国代表处沟通与合作，有助于中国培养熟悉中国国情、了解国际规则，并能 够与国际社会交流、对话、沟通与合作的国际化人才队伍。

Reference 3 - 0.47% Coverage

降低管理成本，提高援助效率。依托 FAO 平台，可以降低中国   
对外援助项目的管理成本，弥补中国在受援国缺乏专门援外管理和协调机构 的不足。中国开展的对外援助，其国内管理部门的大部分职能是在中国国内 进行的，在受援国的援助管理主要依托中国驻外使馆和经商处，随着对外援 助项目的增加和规模的扩大，使馆和经商处因人力资源有限难以对援助项目 提供专业化的管理

Reference 4 - 0.34% Coverage

在援助国与受援国间加入第三方平台，可以避免援助国和受援国双方直   
接的利益矛盾与冲突，进而避免彼此掣肘。通过国际组织的平台可以架起援 助国和受援国双方的合作桥梁，通过国际组织的国际化运行规则实施对外援 助项目，能建立对各方都具有一定舒适度的合作环境

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Tingting Diploma Serves Diplomacy China’s “Donor Logic” in - § 1 reference coded [ 0.17% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

In the last 50 years, China has forged cooperative relations in the field of education with 50 African countries; however, it has received very little attention, compared with the extensive discussions of China’s economic relations with Africa.21

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Yanzhong Domestic Politics and China’s Health Aid to Africa - § 21 references coded [ 5.79% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

Indeed, despite the widespread famine experienced in the countryside, China was still exporting food to Africa.1

Reference 2 - 0.14% Coverage

The health   
aid policy process unfolded when central Party and government leaders were directly involved in foreign aid and central ministries-in-charge were directly accountable to the Party centre.

Reference 3 - 0.46% Coverage

This highly hierarchical and unified policy structure, when   
coupled with the predominance of political and ideological factors, enhanced the “bandwagon” effect, which led to relatively efficient decision-making and discouraged wilful disobedience in policy implementation.20   
While China’s economic conditions   
did not allow it to budget significant funding for the medical teams, almost all Chinese provinces offered experienced and often senior health workers to the foreign aid medical teams. Even some of the poorest provinces—such as Guizhou, Ningxia and Gansu—jumped on the bandwagon by sending medical teams to Africa in the 1970s.

Reference 4 - 0.17% Coverage

The use of administrative fiat to manage foreign aid projects entailed a cookie-cutter approach that emphasised political correctness and ideological commitments, disregarded economic costs and benefits as well as local policy environment,

Reference 5 - 0.29% Coverage

he heroism, the language of sacrifice, and the spirit of mobilisation and   
collectivism of the Cultural Revolution were also internalised by Chinese aid workers and affected their choices in building aid projects and in interacting with local governments. Some CMTs in Africa, like those posted to Zanzibar, played an active role in exporting revolution by inciting local people to rebel against their governments.23

Reference 6 - 0.34% Coverage

Instead   
of offering free medical assistance, China now asked some African countries to cover the living expenses and international airfare of the CMTs. By the early 1980s, among the 27 African countries hosting CMTs, only four were still receiving medical assistance for free, and 16 shouldered the full or partial cost of financing CMTs (Table 1). Strictly speaking, for those countries that covered the full cost, the CMTs were no longer part of China’s foreign aid package.39

Reference 7 - 0.23% Coverage

The power   
of traditional foreign aid bureaucracies was further curtailed by the 1992 administrative reform, which emphasised competition, efficiency and the role of the market. Under the rubric of building a socialist market economy and “separating government functions from enterprise management” (zhengqi fenkai

Reference 8 - 0.16% Coverage

A major policy change was the implementation in 1995 of the system of concessional aid loans (“soft loans”) to develop national economies in the recipient countries and encourage Chinese firms to open up markets in Africa

Reference 9 - 0.15% Coverage

Rather than focus on the dispatch of medical teams, China diversified forms of health aid by expanding its investment in health-related infrastructure, human resources for health and delivery in medical services.

Reference 10 - 0.28% Coverage

This represented a significant change in China’s   
health aid pattern because between 1956 and 1999, China had only helped construct 20 hospitals in Africa.55   
Jiabao further pledged that China would provide medical equipment and anti-malarial materials worth approximately US$79 million to the hospitals and anti-malarial centres built by China and train 3,000 doctors and nurses for Africa.5

Reference 11 - 0.76% Coverage

tween 2007 and 2011, more than half of the estimated Chinese health assistance to Africa went to the construction of hospitals and anti-malarial centres, training of health personnel and provision of medical equipment and drugs.57 Meanwhile, Chinese state enterprises have also become increasingly involved   
in the DAH process. Since 1996, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has provided financial support to build four hospitals and 106 clinics in Sudan.58   
In   
2000, China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group (CNMC) acquired the Nkana Mine Hospital and developed it into the second-largest hospital in Zambia.59   
Now called   
Sinozam Friendship Hospital, it is the only hospital on the continent independently operated by the Chinese. Chinese construction companies are encouraged to build medical infrastructure in Africa. For example, for the cost incurred in building the promised hospital and anti-malarial centre in Ghana, the China EXIM Bank credited aid funds directly to the Beijing Institute of Architecture Design and the China GeoEngineering Corporation.

Reference 12 - 0.42% Coverage

Due to its huge market potential,61   
Africa has also become one of the favoured   
regions for Chinese pharmaceutical firms to “go global”. Major Chinese firms Sinopharm, Guilin Pharma, KPC (Kunming) and Beijing Holley-Cotec set up production plants and offices to market their products in African countries.62   
Even so, only   
a small number of Chinese pharmaceutical companies have been GMP-approved (GMP: good manufacturing practice) by the World Health Organization and few Chinese pharmaceuticals have received WHO prequalification to supply to international organisations and donor funds.63

Reference 13 - 0.24% Coverage

These documents and regulations, though, are expected to reflect the basic preferences of top Party-state leaders. Indeed, major policy decisions on foreign aid, such as the 2006 decision to double aid to Africa by 2009, were made by top Chinese leadership through the State Council or the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group.

Reference 14 - 0.17% Coverage

The role of MOFCOM as a decision-maker, however, should not be overstated. Like the US Agency for International Development (USAID), MOFCOM itself does not have sufficient authority to coordinate policy-making related to foreign aid.

Reference 15 - 0.24% Coverage

In 2008, MOFCOM, MFA and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) established the foreign aid inter-agency liaison mechanism, which was later upgraded to an inter-agency coordination mechanism that now includes 33 members.81   
Furthermore, MOFCOM   
is not the primary decision-maker in handling emergency humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

Reference 16 - 0.28% Coverage

An   
analysis on the disbursement process of health aid money and the operation of specific health aid programmes such as CMTs revealed that the MOFCOM clearly lacks the authority and capacity to implement foreign aid projects. The distribution of DAH money is a highly fragmented process (Figure 2), which involves at least four other central government agencies, namely MOF, MFA, EXIM Bank and MOH.

Reference 17 - 0.22% Coverage

owever, MOF first disburses the regular aid money to MOFCOM, which may earmark it directly to designated contactors for constructing aid projects, indirectly transfer it to EXIM Bank as subsidies for soft loans used in aid projects, or distribute it to MOH as budget support for the latter’s health aid programmes

Reference 18 - 0.15% Coverage

Disaster relief and humanitarian aid   
(including dispatch of medical personnel to disaster zones) is not considered part of the regular budget for foreign aid. Instead, the money is disbursed by MOF directly to MFA.

Reference 19 - 0.51% Coverage

Similar to the disbursement of DAH funds, the implementation of specific health   
aid programmes is also a highly decentralised and fragmented process. Officially, MOFCOM is entrusted to manage the implementation of construction and technical cooperation projects as well as training programmes associated with China’s foreign aid. This includes constructing and managing hospitals and providing housing for CMTs. MOH is officially in charge of the management of CMTs, but it has delegated that authority to provincial health departments since 1985.90   
simply plays a coordinating role in the dispatch and management of medical teams. Under this structure of “designated management, provincial responsibility

Reference 20 - 0.18% Coverage

Each province   
is usually “twinned” with a particular African country (Figure 3). That being said, a province may have medical teams posted to several countries in a given year while an African state may host medical teams from different Chinese provinces.

Reference 21 - 0.33% Coverage

The decentralisation does not stop at the provincial level. Indeed, in some   
provinces (such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang), health bureaus at the city level (such as Nanjing, Yangzhou and Wenzhou) take on the responsibility to form CMTs each year. Prior to their departure, CMT members receive training organised by the MOH and provincial bureaus. Chinese embassies (consulates) are in charge of the front-line coordination and management of medical teams in the host countries.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Xu et al. Science, Technology, and the Politics of Knowledge - § 5 references coded [ 2.22% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.40% Coverage

A central feature of China’s agricultural engagement has been to undertake the transfer of technology, particularly through the 23 Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) across Africa. The ATDC has been developed as a new model of China’s oﬃcial agricultural technology aid to African countries since 2006. A central feature is to combine a business operation with the aid-funded project to ensure ﬁnancial sustainability after the three-year technical cooperation period.

Reference 2 - 0.54% Coverage

Building on a long history, a technocratic rationality has therefore been entrenched in China’s agricultural aid to African countries. It prioritizes productivity improvement and economic development via technological solutions, highlights the leading role of the state in the national development agenda, and adopts an approach of close state–business linkage for development sustainability. In other words, China’s aid policies and practices not only deliver speciﬁc particular technologies to Africa, but traveling with them as part of the aid encounter, Chinese development cooperation fosters the transfer of a wider technocratic development ideology,

Reference 3 - 0.42% Coverage

chnologies therefore travel from China to Africa not just as ‘‘things”, but they are bound up with social, historical, and political meanings and implications. This reﬂects the ideological and political dimensions of technology transfer agricultural development cooperation. Technologies, initially constructed in particular Chinese settings, travel with these contexts, and so adopt a particular ‘‘rationality”, that is at once technical, social, cultural and political, and embedded in historical experiences

Reference 4 - 0.56% Coverage

The ATDC is presented as an innovative model for China-   
Africa agricultural cooperation. The Center is focused on local agricultural development via technology demonstration and transfer, with land ownership in the hands of local technical cooperation partners. It is very far from the ‘‘land grab” of much media commentary. However, even though the ATDC is a technology-centered scheme, it is inevitably political. Both political interests and technical expertise interplay during the ATDC commissioning process. In China, the establishment ofATDCs involves negotiation between central and provincial governments, and between the state and diﬀerent enterprises and institutes.

Reference 5 - 0.30% Coverage

he ATDC is also a social and political space for ChinaAfrican relations and development cooperation. Most are close to the capital city, making it convenient for political visits, study tours, and presentations. Presidents and responsible ministers along with Chinese ambassadors were often present at the ‘‘hand-over” ceremony to exhibit the high proﬁle of the project.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Denghua Zhang China in Pacific Regional Politics - § 1 reference coded [ 0.81% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.81% Coverage

Many of those companies have been the contractors of Chinese aid projects, especially concessional loans projects. Here it should be noted that, according to China’s requirement, projects funded by Chinese concessional loans need to be undertaken by Chinese companies, especially the SOEs. For instance, the China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation has dominated Chinese aid projects in Tonga and the Cook Islands. Conducting Chinese aid projects in recipient countries has been a short cut for these companies to get established in the local markets before they bid for commercial projects.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Weng et al. Will China redefine development patterns in Africa - § 4 references coded [ 1.35% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.22% Coverage

We show that the assumption that China’s state-owned enterprises are dominating extractive industries is not always the case and the Chinese private sector is becoming increasingly inﬂuential in Africa.

Reference 2 - 0.20% Coverage

However, this is no longer the case. Since 2005, the private sector, rather than government has increasingly become the engine of economic exchange between China and Africa (Shen, 2015).

Reference 3 - 0.26% Coverage

Ofﬁcial data sources do not accurately track China’s private companies in Africa (Gu, 2009). According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2008, China had more than 2800 enterprises in Africa, of which approximately 85 per cent were privately owned

Reference 4 - 0.68% Coverage

Although China’s policy banks place Chinese investors at a distinct advantage in sourcing funds for infrastructure projects in Africa, there are still many obstacles to overcome. In this case, the Chinese Hanlong Group had received a letter of guarantee from the China Development Bank (CDB). The CDB is one of China’s major policy banks, providing funding for large infrastructure projects overseas (Brautigam, 2009). CDB conﬁrmed that it would provide a debt facility of up to US$1.022 billion in 2012, but this commitment was abandoned when Hanlong’s Chairman was found guilty of corruption and subsequently executed by authorities (BBC, 2014)

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Zhang and Smith China’s foreign aid system structure, agencies, a - § 11 references coded [ 3.50% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.29% Coverage

While MOFCOM is the main aid agency in China, it is an implementation agency with limited independence. Aid policies are made by the central government representing the Party. As an example, many observers wondered why MOFCOM delayed the release of its second White Paper on Foreign Aid, to the point where many statistics in the original document were out of date

Reference 2 - 0.38% Coverage

Although China does not have a central aid agency, it established an interagency liaison mechanism in 2008 and upgraded it to a coordination mechanism in 2011. Members from 33 agencies meet regularly to coordinate aid policies and discuss policy planning and institution building. MOFCOM (chair), MFA (deputy chair) and MoF (deputy chair) are the core players; line ministries such as Agriculture and Health are also represented, as are China Exim Bank and the Bank of China

Reference 3 - 0.33% Coverage

MOFCOM manages China’s aid and thus plays the most important role. The DFA is the organisation tasked by MOFCOM to manage aid. Its responsibilities include drafting aid policies, regulations24 and plans, including the annual plan and five-year country plans. It also approves and manages aid projects. DFA has around 70 staff specialising in foreign aid, grouped into 14 divisions and one general office.25

Reference 4 - 0.51% Coverage

MOFCOM is the statutory body on economic development and the caretaker of Chinese   
companies overseas, so economic interests are prominent when it makes decisions on foreign aid. After the ‘Go Global Strategy’ (zouchuqu zhanlue) was adopted in October 2000, Chinese companies – many of which had gone global long before – were encouraged to explore opportunities overseas including in trade, investment and resource development. In foreign aid, the principle of mutual benefit underpins MOFCOM’s assistance for Chinese aid contractors to explore overseas markets for Chinese goods, and to satisfy China’s resource needs.37

Reference 5 - 0.25% Coverage

MFA has ‘veto power’ over whether aid serves China’s foreign policy interests, particularly   
relating to Taiwan, a major factor behind the size and direction of Chinese aid flows. Although China claims it attaches no political strings, all recipient countries must recognise Mainland China, rather than Taiwan.

Reference 6 - 0.23% Coverage

MFA supports high levels of foreign aid because it enhances China’s relations with other   
countries, making it easier for MFA to achieve its political mandate. A good example is MFA’s crucial role in facilitating China’s trilateral aid cooperation with the US in Timor-Leste.51 C

Reference 7 - 0.22% Coverage

As MoF is the keeper of the purse strings, foreign aid project proposals need to be circulated to MoF for approval. In terms of direct funding for Chinese aid, MoF covers the gap between the commercial and concessional interest rate for China Exim Bank’s concessional loans.

Reference 8 - 0.30% Coverage

Domestically, the MoF looks after loans to China from traditional donors and multilateral agencies. In terms of bureaucratic interests, MoF’s stake in China’s foreign aid is less than that of MOFCOM and MFA. Their main concern is keeping aid spending in check, similar to their efforts to limit the funds disbursed for domestic schemes such as the Western Development strategy

Reference 9 - 0.18% Coverage

China’s first aid white paper did not include any details on China’s multilateral aid, as the MoF simply refused to release its data to MOFCOM. MoF eventually gave the green light to provide aid data for the second white paper.65

Reference 10 - 0.29% Coverage

Another way contractors influence China’s aid is to propose projects to the Economic and   
Commercial Counsellor’s office in country, or by lobbying MOFCOM and China Exim Bank. As companies become established in recipient countries, they build close relations with Chinese government agencies, host government ministries, local politicians and companies.

Reference 11 - 0.50% Coverage

Firms are willing to lobby Chinese ministries, China Exim Bank and the recipient countries   
for new projects because once both countries agree on a project, the company which initiated it will typically win the contract. In some circumstances, Chinese firms and host governments enter into an informal alliance in which China’s companies persuade host governments to raise new aid projects with China while the contractors promise to help behind the scenes to secure financing. The projects are reverse-engineered to suit the political needs of local politicians and the commercial strategies of Chinese contractor

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Jianzhi Zhao The governance of China’s foreign aid system Evolution - § 2 references coded [ 0.88% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.21% Coverage

Strong institutional inertia, including bureaucratic fragmentation as a general characteristic of Chinese aid system, has been a significant characteristic of the foreign aid system and has delayed major restructuring to its bureaucracies.

Reference 2 - 0.68% Coverage

Development finance of CDB has mainly been executed through its provincial branches through the twining assistance. For example, loan decision and project operation in Ethiopia are made by its branch based in Qinghai Province, a relatively remote and lowincome province. This is somewhat counterintuitive because of two reasons. The first is the possible misarrange or even mismatch in endowments between Qinghai and Ethiopia. Qinghai is in Northwestern China where industrialization is barely developed. The Qinghai Branch is probably not the ideal provider of technical assistance and expertise to Ethiopia. According to a report on Qinghai Daily, an official newspaper, on July 7, 2011, CDB Qinghai signed an agreement with Ethiopia Sugar Corporation to provide it with a loan of USD 150 million.13

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Zhang et al. Tension and Adaptation in a Chinese Agricultu - § 4 references coded [ 1.38% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

At the Fourth FOCAC summit in 2009, China announced that the number of demonstration Centres increased to 20. By 2016, 23 ATDCs had been built in African countries, and the China–Mozambican ATDC was the ﬁrst completed.

Reference 2 - 0.21% Coverage

t China does not provide direct budget support to the recipient government but builds a complete project and then transfers the operation to the recipient country’s government after ﬁnishing construction of required facilities

Reference 3 - 0.25% Coverage

f the recipient country needs further assistance in operating the project, China will continue to provide technical support. This model is typically reﬂected in the agricultural aid projects in Africa, like the ATDCs, and in infrastructure projects such as sports stadiums.

Reference 4 - 0.73% Coverage

fter the ‘going out’ policy became explicit in 1995, China’s foreign aid policy clearly stated that business enterprises should be the major implementers of China’s foreign aid projects and the combination of aid, trade and investment was encouraged. Many large-scale and medium-scale   
enterprises became an important force in China’s foreign aid. However, in contrast to ‘turnkey’ projects in other sectors, where Chinese companies only send technical experts to help local partners solve the maintenance problems of constructed facilities, in an ATDC project, the Chinese implementing agency, also known as the project Operator, usually a commercial company or a research institute from China, continues to be responsible for operating the Centre, even after it has been handed over to the local partners.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 China’s Foreign Aid to Cameroon Perception fron NGOs 2007-2017 - § 3 references coded [ 0.81% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.35% Coverage

One important implication for technology transfer is the increase of Chinese training (internal and external) programs in Cameroon. Many of the nationals working in most of these China’s aid projects should be trained simultaneously, during the implementation process of these Chinese aid and development assistance. However, it is not always the case.

Reference 2 - 0.27% Coverage

The impact of China’s aid leading to technology transfer is insignificant. Training of Cameroonian experts and engineers may be possible in a given project, but generally, when it comes to rehabilitation of most of these numerous projects, it is been carried out by Chinese experts.

Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage

However, this aid is insufficient to tackle all the domains of significant importance for a better development pattern. All major areas in Cameroon need to be improved thus in great need of funds.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 Dong and Chapman Foreign aid study Chinese schools and Chinese point - § 2 references coded [ 0.47% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.09% Coverage

We can also say that the foreign aid concept of the Party and the state is known to the public through the public statements of the Party and state leaders.

Reference 2 - 0.39% Coverage

he focus of Chinese foreign policy shifted from opposing imperialism to enabling domestic economic growth after 1978. And the form of foreign aid has also changed from one-way aid to mutually beneficial cooperation (White Paper, 2011). Economic motivation has gradually replaced political (diplomatic) motivation as the primary motive, while mutual benefits and the notion of win-win co-operation have become the most important prin-   
ciples of China’s foreign aid. Chinese scholars often use such terms as ‘foreign economic and technological cooperation’ (duiwai jingji jishu hezuo) and ‘foreign economic cooperation’ (duiwai jingji hezuo) while studying foreign aid.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 Xuefei Shi From Chengdu to KampalaThe Role of Subnational Actors - § 13 references coded [ 3.62% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage

Subnational actors as development agents have been a topic missing in the discourse regarding   
China’s aid. This article draws attention to three sectors of decentralized cooperation in which Chinese subnational actors play a big part: health aid, agricultural aid and educational aid.

Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage

China’s aid system is decentralized and that it is the endogenous   
twinning character that structurally diﬀerentiates the Chinese aid from those of other donors.

Reference 3 - 0.26% Coverage

Chinese aid is implemented in a decentralized way, involving subnational actors such as provincial governments, city governments, local hospitals, local professional institutes, and local universities. These subnational actors are responsible for the formalization of relationship with foreign governments or counterparts in their respective ﬁelds.

Reference 4 - 0.51% Coverage

twinning in the Chinese context aims to provide long-term, stable relationships of technical cooperation as the traditional donors do. The major diﬀerence is that, while in the North–South decentralized cooperation the twinned partners at both sides are mirror-like (i.e. city to city, university to university, and hospital to hospital), China’s decentralized cooperation can be bilaterally asymmetric. For example, a Chinese provincial medical team can build a relationship with a national government, not with a hospital in this recipient country. This diﬀerence can be traced back to China’s domestic policy and makes the formation of twinning in China more complicated than in the traditional donor countries.

Reference 5 - 0.23% Coverage

The ﬁrst interpretation regards China’s aid as a contracting system.25 For example, decentralized actors may participate in foreign aid via contracting projects; this interpretation is unitary and vertical because it emphasizes the authority of central agencies and fails to recognize the autonomy of contractors.

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

Decentralization at home pushes subnational Chinese actors to go abroad, twin with and cluster in the destination countries.

Reference 7 - 0.28% Coverage

Considering the same political economy in which domestic twinning emerges, this article deﬁnes the scope of decentralized cooperation in China as development cooperation formalized by subnational actors with coordination from central agencies. The subnational actors include provincial-level governments (provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions)43 and local city government

Reference 8 - 0.16% Coverage

decentralized cooperation in China is connected to a special delivery mechanism called twinning. Decentralized cooperation may not signiﬁcantly increase the volume of China’s foreign aid except for subnational subsidies for

Reference 9 - 0.69% Coverage

It is seen as a way of aid allocation, and under such a point of view, most of China’s aid programs have the element of decentralized cooperation at the implementation stage, which can be the very nature of China’s aid architecture. Most typical decentralized cooperation takes place in sectoral aid such as health, agriculture   
and education, as the majority of implementers (hospitals, agricultural research institutes and universities) are organized at the subnational level while the corresponding ministries are merely made of a limited number of non-technical bureaucrats. The overseas medical teams, which started to be sent out in 1963, are perhaps the most well-known example of decentralized cooperation. There are in general more than 40 Chinese medical teams from 23 provinces and municipalities working in African countries, and each Chinese province has been twinned with at least one African country, for instance, Yunnan with Uganda and HenanwithZambia

Reference 10 - 0.30% Coverage

ince 2006, the Chinese have funded 25 ATDCs in Africa. Even though the ATDCs are constructed as turn-key projects, the MOA assigns the selection of agricultural experts to a local government and a local department of agriculture. As a result, most of the 25 centers in Africa have contracts with teams from Chinese provinces. For example, Chongqing sent a team to Tanzania; a Hubei team is in Mozambique, and a Sichuan team in Uganda.

Reference 11 - 0.33% Coverage

Not only every Confucius   
Institute (CI) is linked with at least one Chinese university (e.g. Dar es Salaam CI and Zhejiang Normal University, Dodoma CI and Zhengzhou UniversityofAeronautics),butother formsof cultural exchange for educational purposes are carried out by twinned Chinese organizations. For instance, the autonomous region Inner Mongolia has twinned with Seychelles for training and donation between public-funded libraries and dance troupes.4

Reference 12 - 0.21% Coverage

Twinning is usually molded at the provincial level, from which come the administrative orders   
for public institutions to join in the twinning. For instance, every two years, old members of a provincial medical team are to be replaced by newcomers from another hospital in the same province.

Reference 13 - 0.24% Coverage

What is interesting here is that the provision of ﬁnance is usually carried out, not by CDB’s main oﬃce in Beijing, but by its provincial branches. For instance, CDB Guizhou has been responsible for the bank’s ﬁnancing in Kenya and Tanzania.59 Whether this type of cooperation has any element of decentralization requires further study.